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Introduction and summary 
 
 
This chapter estimates indicators of direct and indirect intervention by the Mexican 
government in agriculture over the period 1979 to 2005. To put the estimates in context, we 
describe the main characteristics of Mexican agriculture and the main economic policy 
developments that affected the sector over the last 25 years. We present estimates of the 
Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for crops and animal products that comprise about 70 
percent of the total value of Mexican agricultural production. 
A significant share of Mexico’s population lives in rural areas. In 2005, Mexico’s 
population was 103 million, with 23 percent living in rural areas. This is less than half the 57 
percent share living in rural areas in 1950. Agriculture remains important for employment in 
Mexico. In 2005, about 20 percent (8.5 million) of Mexico’s 43 million economically active 
population was employed in agriculture.  
Mexico is in the final stages of a demographic transition: in the past 5 years the rate of 
population growth was 1.2 percent per year, almost one third of the 3.1 percent annual growth 
rate of the 1950s and a half of that of 1990-95. Migration to the US, to urban areas, and 
within urban centers are powerful forces in Mexican labor markets. 
For the period we analyze, Mexico had relatively modest economic growth. Growth 
levels averaging more than 5 percent per annum from 1950 and 1970, but GDP growth 
diminished to 2.6 percent per annum between 1980 and 2005. This translates into a low 
growth in per capita terms of just 0.9 per annum; or a cumulative 25 percent over the last 25 
years. Table 1 shows the composition of growth by the three main economic sectors. Sluggish 
agricultural growth from the mid-1980s led to a lower share for agriculture in overall GDP. 
The services sector now accounts for about two thirds of total GDP.  
Economic policy developments in Mexican agriculture since the late 1980s, and in 
particular since the late 1990s, marked a clear departure from the earlier closed economy and   
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interventionist schemes. Until 1990 Mexican agricultural policies were characterized by 
direct market interventions, with domestic prices in general kept above world prices by 
means of tariffs and import quotas. Beginning in 1991, the policy regime changed. Although 
some price support schemes remained in place, payments are being made on the basis of land 
owned or inputs used, which is more supportive of markets. NAFTA contributed to Mexcio’s 
trade liberalization: in the context of NAFTA almost all trade barriers with the United States 
were eliminated by 2005. The main Mexican agricultural policy now in place is direct income 
payments to farmers.  
Our NRA results illustrate the policy shift. For agricultural products covered  in this 
study, nominal assistance averaged 17 percent in 2000-04. This implies a one-third decrease 
from the NRA in 1990-94. The share of non-product-specific assistance in Mexico’s 
aggregate NRA increased significantly over the same period.  
 
 
Agriculture in Mexico 
 
 
Agricultural land in Mexico is approximately 75 percent rain-fed and 25 percent irrigated. 
Major uses of land are crop agriculture (13 percent of total area), livestock (55 percent), and 
forestry (23 percent). Within agriculture, annual cultivation dominates, accounting for 
approximately 85 percent of total agricultural land use. Grains – maize, beans, wheat, and 
sorghum – occupy 80 percent of the cultivated area, with maize alone occupying 52 percent 
of total cultivated acreage (Table 2). Much of the agricultural sector is characterized by low 
value crops and low labor productivity.  
There are vast differences across rural areas in Mexico. A small number of 
commercial, globally-competitive large farms coexist with many import-substituting and 
subsistence-oriented small farms. The overall incidence of poverty is more than five time 
higher in the rural sector than in the urban sector, although there are large regional 
differences. Poverty is much higher in the South. 
Over the past 15 years, the rural sector in Mexico experienced sweeping reform in 
land tenure, prices, markets and trade liberalization. Public investments, privatization, fiscal 
transfers, and the retrenchment of key autonomous public firms (known as paraestatales) 
also impacted on the rural sector. The policy changes produced shifts in the rural economy, 
increasingly linking Mexican farm prices to international prices. Farmers in productive areas  
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switched to new technologies and higher value crops. Large scale farmers — which are well 
connected to markets — adapted easily to the new environment. Subsistence farmers, on the 
other hand, mostly continued to be isolated from market forces. This is because they tend to 
live in regions where there is a limited potential to shift to higher value crops or to 
sustainable intensification. Many of these farmers instead resorted to migration and 
employment in local off-farm jobs to complement their agricultural income.  
Pressure on marginal lands remains high and forests at the agricultural frontier 
continue to be cleared for subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry.  
Agricultural yields for major importables and exportables grew during the 1990s in 
Mexico, particularly on irrigated lands. The heterogeneous nature of Mexican agriculture 
(one third of farmers produce for self consumption) and a series of sectoral programs to 
manage the transition to a more market-oriented economy helped prevent a collapse in 
domestic production of corn and other importables after the NAFTA agreement. 
Total and rural poverty levels (Head Count Index) are shown in Figure 1 by region 
(Capital area, Center, Center North, Gulf, North, Pacific and South). Poverty levels are 
somewhat higher in rural areas than in the urban areas of Mexico, but there has been a 
substantial drop in those levels in the last 20 years. Regional differences in poverty levels 
remain though: in the North, the Pacific and the Capital areas there are relatively low levels 
of poverty, while the indicence is higher in the Center, Gulf and South regions of Mexico. 
A recent study quantified the impact of growth on poverty reduction in Mexico 
(Soloaga and Torres 2007). The authors found that urban economic growth has an elasticity 
of around one in reducing head count poverty levels in urban areas. Rural growth (broadly 
defined as growth in agriculture and non-agricultural output in rural areas) has the same 
elasticity in reducing head count poverty in rural areas. But the study also found that rural 
growth has a greater impact on other poverty measures (the depth and severity of poverty), 
thus having a more pro-poor impact than urban growth. 
 
 




Since the mid-1980s, Mexico experienced strong changes in its economic policy, mostly 
aimed at driving the economy towards openness and competition. The opening up and 
                                                 
1 For developments up to 2001 this section draws on Soloaga (2004).  
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deregulation of the economy impacted heavily on the agricultural sector. The new policies 
included significant trade and price reforms as well as the privatization of autonomous public 
enterprises, some of them of crucial importance for the agricultural sector. These reforms 
increasingly exposed the sector to global forces and to a totally new set of rules in land, 
output and input markets. This section provides a summary of main aspects of these policy 
reforms.  
 
The opening up of the economy 
 
Since 1985 Mexico has significantly reduced its tariffs, joining GATT in 1986. With the 
exception of sugar, the maximum tariff rate dropped from 100 percent to 20 percent. Mexico 
met most of its international commitments ahead of time and ahead of other developing 
countries. For example, GATT allowed Mexico to have a maximum tariff of 50 percent, but 
tariffs have been significantly lower than this since the 1980s, and many import licenses were 
converted to tariffs.  
In 1994 Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with 
Canada and the United States. NAFTA’s main declared purposes are to eliminate tariff and 
non-tariff barriers among member states and to facilitate investment within the free trade 
area. NAFTA also contains provisions dealing with the environment and labor rights. Tariffs 
among NAFTA members were set at lower levels than the GATT provisions: the three 
countries agreed to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers by 2008 according to a fixed 
program. Under NAFTA, Mexico liberalized 42 percent of tariff codes and agreed to phase 
out tariffs on foodstuffs and cotton over a period of 5 to 15 years. In addition, import 
licensing for these crops began to disappear and subsidies for bread producers were 
eliminated (Rello and Trápaga 2001). 
 
Changes in domestic policies 
 
In the agricultural sector, domestic policy changes included the liberalization of land property 
rights of the ejidal (common land) sector, the elimination or reduction of producer price 
supports on basic crops, the abolition of CONASUPO (Mexico's Agricultural State Trade 
Enterprise), and the reduction or elimination of input, credit and insurance subsidies (Casco 
1999, OECD 1997, Cornelius and Myhre 1998, and Yunez-Naude 2003). Each of these 
policies is described below.  
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Reform in the ejido sector 
The ejido sector grew out of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which embodied a strong 
program of land reform. Under the program, the government granted land and water 
resources to communities of producers (known as ejidos). The community's members, or 
ejidatarios, had usufruct rights to the land contingent on occupation and cultivation. They 
were prohibited from hiring labor. Under the ejido system, land could not be alienated, rented 
or mortgaged and absences from the ejido of more than two years led to a forefeit of land 
rights. By late 1980s, the system accounted for 30,000 ejidos with 3.2 million ejidatarios, 
about 70 percent of whom were agricultural producers. The ejidos sector controlled the 
majority of the country’s agricultural resources, including approximately half of Mexico’s 
farm land and 70 percent of the nation’s forests. The sector was responsible for more than 70 
percent of the nation's corn production and 80 percent of bean production (de Janvry et al. 
1995). However, by the late 1980s, the sector was obsolete and characterized by productive 
inflexibility and increasing non-compliance with the sector’s legal framework. To allow the 
ejido sector to adjust to economic liberalization, the Mexican government initiated a bold 
program of agrarian reform in 1992.  
Reform of the ejido sector was seen as a critical part of the agriculutral sector reform. 
A change in the land tenure system and greater economic collaboration with the private sector 
were considered the key ingredients in a reform package that would enable the ejido sector to 
modernize and adjust to the economic reforms. In 1992, the government modified Article 27 
of the Mexican Constitution governing all land use in Mexico and the related Agrarian Laws. 
With respect to the ejido sector, there were four important changes. First, the 70 year old 
agrarian ejido reform program came to an end, although the concentration of land in large 
estates remained forbidden and a legal mechanism was created to distribute individual 
landholdings in excess of the legal size limits. Second, prohibitions against the sale, rental 
and sharecropping of parceled ejido farm-land and land for human settlement were removed. 
(Nonetheless, the sale of parceled farm-land to outsiders required the approval of the ejido 
assembly unless the latter had previously approved the passage of the land parcel to dominio 
pleno or “full title” status.) Third, Ejido members were prohibited from redefining the 
boundaries of communal land, or from exercising their traditional right that allows them to 
assign common land individually (even though it cannot be appropriated individually). And  
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fourth, economic associations between private sector entrepreneurs and ejidatarios were 
prohibited. 
These reforms were expected to have several benefits. They were expected to 
encourage investment in ejido land, as farmers gained greater land security and higher 
expected future incomes and returns to investments. The reforms also were expected to 
increase the supply of credit, as farmers could now use their land as collateral for a loan. 
Thirdly, the ability to engage in rental and sale transactions was expected to promote a more 
efficient allocation of land among agricultural producers, as land would be passed from less 
to more productive farmers. Although the state no longer told ejidatarios what to grow and 
how to market their output, the policy also meant that the government would no longer 
provide widespread technical assistance, input and output subsides, and marketing channels.  
The main instrument of the reform was the PROCEDE (Proceso de certificación de 
Ejidos y Solares Urbanos). As ejido land became tradable, the PROCEDE system helped to 
resolve boundary conflicts, regulate land tenure, and property right certificates were issued to 
members of the ejidos. The program, which started in 1993, allowed ejidatarios to choose 
their property rights regime, delineate ejido boundaries, and measure individual plots. 
Eventually certificates were issued to individuals for individually owned plots of land 
(including house plots) and communally managed lands. PROCEDE also played an important 
information gathering role: all communities had a legal land situation diagnostic completed. 
Overall, 2.9 million agrarian subjects received their titles and certificates, and 57 million 
hectares of land were measured and mapped. 
Many positive outcomes have been attributed to PROCEDE: equity through increased 
land access for ejidatario households and for about 1 million avencindados and posesionarios 
households that previously had no property rights; conflict resolution and social peace in 
rural areas; improved governance and transparency at the grassroots level; improved access to 
common property resources; permissible participation in off-farm labor markets; and 
improved functioning of land markets. A cost-benefit analysis of the program suggests that, 
although the costs were not inconsequential, the program was justified on economic grounds 
(World Bank 2001). 
 
Changes in price support and other mechanisms 
Significant reforms in price support mechanisms were initiated in the late 1980s and have 
continued through to the present. In 1988-89, guaranteed prices for wheat, sorghum, barley, 
rice and oilseeds were eliminated, although a similar system of agreement prices was in place  
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for many of these crops between 1992 and 1995. Price subsidies for corn and beans, due to be 
phased out gradually in the early NAFTA years and replaced with a system of direct income 
support payments (PROCAMPO), were eliminated by the currency devaluation in late 1994. 
At the same time, the PROCAMPO program was introduced. The Mexican state withdrew 
from procurement and marketing functions (except for corn and beans, although the 
government sharply reduced its involvement after the 1994-95 currency devaluation). Input 
subsidies on seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, machinery and diesel fuel were partly eliminated. An 
input subsidy on electricity for groundwater pumping is the only major input subsidy that 
remains in place. The current Mexican President has pledged to keep this input subisdy in 
place throuhg to 2012. 
 
The abolition of CONASUPO 
In the past, a key player for the government in agricultural policy was the state agency 
CONASUPO (Yuñez-Naude 2000). The dismantling of this agency provides a sketch for the 
diminishing role of government intervention in the agricultural sector.  
From its creation until the macroeconomic crisis of 1982, CONASUPO’S was a 
growing agency: its subsidiaries grew, and new ones were created. The agency’s activities 
included the processing of grains, oils and milk powder to produce animal feed and consumer 
goods such as corn, flour, wheat, pasta, edible oils and fluid milk. CONASUPO managed 
retail shops selling basic foods to the rural and urban poor, and it was also involved in the 
trade of fertilizer and improved seeds and peasant training programs. 
  
CONASUPO bought a significant amount of maize and other products from 
producers at national guaranteed prices and it imported maize at international prices to be 
sold to regional millers at different prices. A substantially lower price was granted to millers 
in the Federal District. Transportation and handling expenses were absorbed by the agency 
(Larson 1993, p. 4).  
CONASUPO’s functions began to be reduced at the beginning of the 1980s. From 
1991 to 1999, price interventions by CONASUPO were limited to beans and corn. Subsidies 
for inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, machinery and diesel fuel were dismantled. An 
exception was subsidized electricity for groundwater extraction, which was not eliminated. 
Along with several other governmental agencies, CONASUPO’s financial support 
subsidiaries were privatized, dismantled or transferred to farmers. By 1999 the abolition of 
CONASUPO was practically complete.  
8
Until 1989, CONASUPO purchased part of the domestic production of each of 
Mexico’s twelve “basic crops”. In 1996, after a sharp decrease in the international price of 
corn, Mexico initiated an intermediate scheme for price fixation, whereby the domestic price 
was set at a base price at the regional level. The base price was somewhere between a 
guaranteed price and the international price. In the winter season of 1996-97, the price 
supports scheme for corn changed. Corn and beans where bought in the production zone by 
CONASUPO at “indifference prices,” which varied depending the region. Under this scheme, 
CONASUPO became a last-resort buyer of white corn for human consumption, granting 
purchases of corn to those farmers who could not obtain a price higher than the indifference 
price in the private sector. 
The quantity of domestic production purchased by CONASUPO declined in line with 
its decreasing role in domestic corn and bean markets: CONASUPO bought about 41 percent 
of the domestic supply of corn in 1993, 31 percent in 1994, but only 12.5 percent by 1998. In 
1991, the Marketing Agency (ASERCA) assumed the role of CONASUPO in supporting 
producers through price interventions. In the case of corn, the continuation of the policy of 
guaranteed prices applied by CONASUPO meant increasing market price support each year 
from 1989 to 1993. (Yuñez-Naude 2000). 
 
Mexican rural financial markets 
The rural financial markets are comprised of organized formal institutions as well as informal 
lenders (trade-lenders and moneylenders). In Mexico, the latter cover a significant part of the 
market and are characterized by high interest rates. Government intermediaries and private 
commercial banks are the country’s main formal lenders. By the mid-1990s, rural 
entrepreneurs had only limited access to financial services, and markets were considered 
either not competitive or highly inefficient (World Bank 1995). The main government 
development institutions in the financial sector are BANRURAL (Bank of Rural 
Development--Banco Nacional de Crédito Rural-- replaced by Rural Financier-Financiera 
Rural-- in 2003, see below) and FIRA (Trusts Related to Agriculture--Fideicomisos 
Instituídos en Relación con la Agricultura). BANRURAL was created in 1975 through the 
merger of three public banks: Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal, Banco Nacional 
Agropecuario and Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola. Its objective was to provide credit to 
low-income agricultural producers unable to provide collateral. BANRURAL comprised 12 
regional banks and 1 national bank located in Mexico City. Before 1995, this institution  
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operated in a complex way providing massive credits to small farmers, distributing 
production inputs, buying products and participating in an insurance system.  
On the other hand, FIRA (Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la Agricultura) 
operates as a discount window for first-tier lenders to discount their working capital and 
investment credit to low and medium-income producers (Carillo 2001 ). After the 1988 
liberalization, the government sold commercial banks, keeping only development institutions.  
This reform forced BANRURAL and FIRA, among others, to operate in a more 
efficient and competitive way towards private intermediaries, thus generating important 
reforms within them. The total amount of loan to the sector reduced in real terms since the 
mid-1980s and even more after the 1995 financial crisis. Moreover, the participation of the 
agricultural sector in the financial markets also decreased sharply . Regarding credit types, 
more than 50 percent of the loans are short-term loans (Préstamos de Avío), and the rest are 
middle and long-term loans (Préstamos Refaccionarios). By 2003, BANRURAL experienced 
financial problems with about 60 percent of its outstanding loans unpaid, and it was replaced 
by Financiera Rural, which is organized with the same objectives as FIRA, although it can 
offer loans directly to producers (OECD 2007). In turn, FIRA´s activities have expanded, and 
it now channels resources also to newly created rural financial intermediares whereas the new 
system PAASFIR (which is the Support Program for Accessing the Financial Rural Sector- 
Programa de Apoyo para Acceder al Sistema Financiero Rural)  provides additional cash 
guarantee over and above guarantees supplied by FIRA. 
In 1990, ‘solidarity funds’ for production were created in order to assist farmers 
excluded from coverage by BANRURAL. The production funds consisted of payments made 
directly to producer who were to reimburse the money received into a community fund. 
PRONASOL (Crédito a la Palabra) was announced in President Salina’s inaugural address 
on 1 December 1988. It was an umbrella social welfare agency that, besides giving credits to 
poor farmers and basic infrastructure, sought to develop health, education, housing, nutrition 
and employment. PRONASOL consolidated programs located in different government 
agencies in order to coordinate their operations in a more cost-effective manner. 
 
The rural poor and access to financial markets 
Access to rural financial services for low-income households remains problematic (World 
Bank 2001, OECD 2007). As a consequence of years of subsidized, directed credit through 
government banks, access to credit remains a major bottleneck for low income rural  
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households seeking to grow their way out of poverty. A lack of financial discipline 
exacerbated by periodic debt forgiveness resulted in poor recovery rates from subsidized, 
directed programs which tended to benefit the better-off anyway. Rural financial markets 
have remained shallow, segmented and “personalized.” Few lenders operate, and at high 
costs. Non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFD), however, were resilient in the face of the 
mid-1990s financial crisis. But they too have been constrained by an inadequate legal, 
regulatory and supervisory environment.  
As a result of these factors, there is a generalized lack of public confidence in the 
banking sector and NBFD. This lack of confidence is costly both to private individuals and in 
terms of Mexico’s development. The poor do in fact save, but in high-risk forms that yield 
low returns. For example, most savings are in the form of highly liquid and insecure physical 
assets such as livestock that suffer high mortality rates: saving rates are 56 percent in 
chickens and 40 percent in pigs. However, according to a recent survey, most farmers 
reported that they had difficulty selling their livestock in times of emergency. They had to 
borrow and then repay the loan by selling the livestock later. Other important forms of 
lending to the rural poor are informal lending to friends etc., and through savings 
associations. Informal lending has a 20 percent arrears/default rate. Tandas (savings 
societies) report a 6 percent non-compliance rate (members who cease to contribute once they 
have taken out their loan). The major forms of savings scored low in terms of liquidity, return 
and safety. 
 
Programs to assist in managing the transition  
 
The government of Mexico implemented major rural programs to assist producers to better 
manage the transition to a liberalized and competitive system (World Bank 2001, OECD 
2007). The most important programs were: PROCAMPO (that started in fall/winter 1993-94), 
ALIANZA PARA AL CAMPO (1996), ASERCA (marketing subsidies that started in 1991), and 
SEDESOL (infrastructure subsidies in poor areas). Another important program that channeled 
resources to the poorest producers was the CREDITO A LA PALABRA administered also by 
SEDESOL. Altogether these programs not only contributed to support the income of farmers 
facing competition from abroad, but they also promoted the use of commercial inputs. This 
led to a rise in the productivity of at least some of Mexico’s farmers (Yunez-Naude 2002). 
Nonetheless, since many of the current subsidies cover a limited range of traditional crops,  
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ASERCA (Apoyos y Servicios a la Comercialización Agropecuaria), created in 1991, 
partially substituted for CONASUPO’s price and direct market interventions by subsidizing 
marketing activities for non-corn and beans producers and by giving direct income transfers 
to farmers producing basic crops. The most important interventions were marketing subsidies 
and the promotion of production contracts. The interventions had four main objectives: to 
promote the development of regional grain markets while ensuring the absorption of 
marketable surpluses; to reduce the price uncertainty that characterizes these crops; to help 
eliminate imbalances in production between the country’s regions; and to develop appropriate 
channels of information about prices, areas planted and other key information that may help 
farmers make optimal management decisions.  
To accomplish these objectives, ASERCA’s marketing subsidies covered the 
difference between a “reference” price established in the previous year and the actual market 
price. Under this program, the government and producer organizations negotiated a certain 
price above that which would prevail if the commodity was imported. Then, in a public bid, 
interested buyers of such crops would ask for a subsidy to commit to buy a certain amount of 
the crop at the negotiated price. Over 90 percent of the program’s commercialization 
subsidies were allocated to wheat, maize, and sorghum. Subsidies were directed mainly 
towards regions with a large share of these crops, and were awarded—up until 2000—to 
marketing firms. 
Until 2001, the scheme was increasingly criticized, mainly because a few large buyers 
asked for subsidies that were too high, relative to prevailing marketing costs, and because it 
was difficult to guarantee that the negotiated price was being paid to the producer 
(Rosenzweig 2003). Consequently, the program changed in 2001 and subsidy payments were 
made directly to producers who enrol in the program in certain designated States identified as 
having an historical surplus of one of the subsidized products. In 2003, the previous focus of 
ASERCA´s operations only on “States with surplus harvests” was also changed. The program 
now addresses its efforts to “producers with surplus production”, disregarding the State 
where the producer has his/her operations. Moreover, the practice of announcing an agreed 
price for each season on a year-by-year basis was replaced by a multi-year commintment over  
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a five-year period for each product in the program. This new approach is known as “Target 
Income” (Ingreso Objetivo), and operates as a deficiency payment. This scheme pays only up 
to a government-set maximun yield per hectare that is determined for each region (OECD 
2007).  
Notwithstanding the reforms in the 2000s, it is likely that the ACERCA subsidy 
program undermines the general objective of trade reform in Mexico, namely to create 
appropriate incentives for producers to shift from grains to vegetables and fruits (World Bank 
2001). This is because ASERCA covers substantial portions of the national production of 
grain crops. For example, in 1999 it covered 32 percent of the summer/spring production, and 
47 percent of the fall/winter production of maize. Since 1996, ASERCA’s coverage of 
fall/winter sorghum production in Taumalipas (the most important State for sorghum) varied 
between 86 and 90 percent. For wheat, ASERCA’s intervention covered almost 100 percent 
of production during the 1998/99 fall/winter cycle. The consequences of these interventions 
in grain markets are particularly troublesome in view of the fact that the prices determined by 
ASERCA generally exceed those that would have prevailed in a completely liberalized 
environment. In all, ASERCA’s intervention impeded an adjustment in the production pattern 
of regions based on local comparative advantage.  
Another major problem with the program is that the fixing of producer prices that do 
not adjust according to the development of the crop cycle, eliminated the incentive to develop 
local storage facilities that producers could use to sell their products with the most profitable 
timing.  
There is ample evidence that a major problem in converting from grains to vegetables 
and fruits lies in the marketing stage. Rather than concentrating on supporting resources on 
grains, ASERCA should have concentrated on promoting and developing the marketing of 
perishables in order to attract resources towards their production. It is hoped that the new 
system currently developed might overcome several of these distortions. 
 
PROCAMPO (Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo-Farms Support Payments Program)  
A major reform in Mexican state intervention in staple production was implemented in 
parallel with the creation of ASERCA. It consisted of the elimination of guaranteed prices 
that CONASUPO had traditionally given to producers of nine crops: cottonseed, grain, 
barley, rice, soybeans, sorghum, safflower, sunflower and wheat. To facilitate the transition 
from price supports to free markets, PROCAMPO — a partially “de-coupled” income  
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support program for all farmers producing basic crops — was implemented in 1994. Under 
the management of the Ministry of Agriculture, PROCAMPO provided cash transfers to 90 
percent of all Mexican farmers to support grain and oilseed producers. The transfers were 
provided on a per hectare basis. PROCAMPO’s mission from its inception was not to support 
production of specific commodities, but rather to support farmer income (Baffes and 
Meerman 1997). Nonetheless, in practice, payments were linked to grain and oilseed 
production.  
PROCAMPO’s main objective was to compensate producers for the elimination of 
deficiency payments, thus compensating agricultural producers for the loss of revenue caused 
by the liberalization of agricultural trade and the removal of price supports in the grain sector. 
It was conceived of as a 15 year program to be phased out by 2008. Eligibility depended on 
total hectares planted of nine key grains and oilseeds in the three agricultural years prior to 
and including August 1993. The nine crops — corn, beans, rice, wheat, sorghum, barley, 
soybeans, cotton, and cardamom — were all previously covered by the CONASUPO 
deficiency payments schedule. The program was expanded in the early years to apply to land 
that was planted and kept for livestock or forest activities, or that was covered by an eligible 
ecological project. No new beneficiaries were added after 1994. The scheme approved 
eligible land parcels, not particular farmers, and therefore payments went to whoever is 
planting at a particular property. Also, payments were set for each cropping season, so that 
payments could be made twice a year where irrigation made two crops per year possible. 
The PROCAMPO program was important because of both the number of producers it 
reached and the large expenditures involved. By 2005, expenses for PROCAMPO amounted 
to about US$1.4 billion (or 0.2 percent of GDP), and the program benefited 2.4 million 
producers who owned 12 millions hectares of land in about 3.5 million land parcels. It is 
estimated that PROCAMPO contributed to about 8 percent of ejidatario´s household income, 
although it could be as high as 40 percent for low-income families. A modification to the 
scheme in 2001 gave preferencial treatment to poor producers: those with less than five 
hectares of rain fed land received payments in advance of planting and those with less than 
one hectare received payments corresponding to a complete hectare. In 2001, the scheme also 
allowed financial institutions to make advance payments to producers who present an 
investment plan equal to the net present value of future entitlements. 
 
SEDESOL (Secretaria Desarrollo Social)  
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The purpose of SEDESOL
 is to support programs whose main content is poverty eradication 
(World Bank 2001). The agricultural sector components of two programs of importance—
PRONASOL and CREDITO A LA PALABRA—were reviewed above under the discussion of 
‘rural financial markets’. PRONASOL aimed to promote social infrastructure at the 
municipal level. The program was initiated in the early 1990s and was characterized by high 
variability in terms of effectiveness, sustainability and targeting. There were a number of 
reformulations of the program.  
CREDITO A LA PALABRA had the objective of supporting with low-interest and 
collateral-free credit small producers on resource-poor rain fed lands. Producers were 
typically cultivating grains for home consumption. To be eligible they had to demonstrate a 
legitimate entitlement to the land they were cultivating and that they were stable residents in 
their community. The program started in 1989 and was expanded in 1990 into the program of 
Solidarity Funds for Production (Fondos de Solidaridad para la produccion).These Funds 
then provided the seed capital for Cajas Solidarias — non-bank financial intermediaries — 
created in 1992. The cajas emphasized savings mobilization. The cajas savings/equity ratio 
rose from 0.09 in 1995 to 0.33 in 1999. It encompassed producers in both the private and 
social sectors and covered up to three hectares of land per producer. At the peak of its 
coverage, the Credito a la Palabra was used by 760,000 producers cultivating 1.4 million 
hectares. The states where most of the beneficiaries were located were Oaxaca, Chiapas, 
Michoacan, Veracruz and Guanajuato. The program had an insurance component that 
facilitated the writing off of loans in case of harvest failure. In 2000, the amount loaned was 
MXP 550 per hectare. While the cajas solidarias achieved an extensive outreach in marginal 
areas, their main challenge is financial sustainability as arrears have risen from around 4 
percent of the portfolio in 1994 to around 22 percent in 1999.  
Finally, SEDESOL participated in PISO, a program that aimed to promote social 
infrastructure at the municipal level and support an orderly and rational urban expansion in 
peri-urban areas.  
 
ALIANZA (Alianza para el Campo-Alliance for the Country Side) 
The ALIANZA program was introduced in 1996 to provide matching grants to agricultural 
producers to promote investment in infrastructure, decrease the incidence of animal diseases, 
and support an integrated development of rural communities. ALIANZA was decentralized, 
with co-financing required from state governments and beneficiary producers. It included  
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several sub-programs. The most important were ferti-irrigation, mechanization, rural 
equipment, pasture improvement and kilo por kilo (which provided growers with one 
kilogram of certified seeds for the price of one kilogram of normal seeds). Together, these 
programs accounted for more than 50 percent of ALIANZA’s budget. State goverments were 
responsible for the implementation of the program at the local level. Most of the programs 
required a matching contribution by the beneficiary (World Bank 2001).  
The ALIANZA program was revised in 2003 (the name changed to Alianza Contigo) 
to serve as an umbrella for around 100 programs, which can be grouped into three categories: 
capitalization programs, product chain enhancement programs, and the creation of 
technologies for supporting agri-food system (OECD 2006). This was complemented by the 
2001 Law for Sustainable Rural Development (Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable), which 
represented a shift from decades of a one-sector agricultural policy to a policy that aims to 
integrate the actions of several ministries and different levels of government (federal, statal 
and municipal). The law established a federal horizontal coordination body specifically for 
rural policy (the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Sustainble Rural Development, CIDRS) 
and a constitution of participatory bodies for civil society (Councils for Sustainable Rural 
Development). It also elaborated on a Special Concerted Program for Rural Development 
(PEC), which evolved into scheme to have a rural budget appended every year to the federal 
budget (OECD 2007).  
 
More-recent programs 
A special program to support electricity and fuel use in agricultural activities was established 
in 2002. This program introduced two new prices for electricity: a single subsidized price that 
applies all the time, and a lower price for pumping at night. These prices were in addition to 
two exisiting prices for electricity for agricultural pumping (one for low tension and one for 
medium tension). In 2003, a preferencial pricing scheme (with some quantity restrictions) 
was inititied for diesel to fuel machinery and equipment used in agricultural and livestock 
production.  
The Progan Program (Programa de Estímulos a la Productividad Agrícola or 
Livestock Productivity Improvement Program) was created in 2003, and consists of a 
payment per animal over four years. Payments start at about US$28 in the first year and 
increase each year by about US$10. To be eligible for the subsidy, producers must register  
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their cattle in the National System of Individual Cattle Identification (SINIIGA). The system 
helps to strengthen sanitary control in the cattle sector. 
 
Expenditure on agricultural programs 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of government annual expenditure on agricultural policies 
over the past ten years. Since 1994, PROCAMPO payments have represented between 31 
percent and 44 percent of SAGARPA´s budget. Expenditure on ALIANZA and ASERCA 
have increased in importance over the period. These three programs together represented 
about two-thirds of SAGARPA’s total expenditures over the last five years. In real terms, 
total expenditures on the three major programs had a clear upward trend between 1995 and 
2002. It plateaued in 2002 at about $2.6 billion (2005 US dollars), equivalent to about 10 




The main agricultural policy measures used in Mexico since the mid-1980s are summarized 
in Table 3. They were initially characterized by direct market interventions, with domestic 
prices in general being kept above world prices by means of tariffs and import quotas. The 
system began to change in 1991 to one where the government provided direct income 
payments and region-specific marketing supports. Border measures were progressively 
liberalized, and the previous extremely high tariffs were converted to tariff-quota schemes. 
The implementation of NAFTA in 1994 implied a de facto liberalization for the most 
important agricultural goods: the in-quota tariff was in general set to zero, and since it was 
not filled that effectively was the marginal tariff. By 2004, almost all the main agricultural 
products had import tariffs equal to zero, and the NAFTA agreement implementation will 
complete the liberalization process for remaining goods by 2008. Thus, agricultural policies 
in Mexico have moved from being predominantly market price supports that increased 




                                                 
2  While the new approach increased the sector’s exposure to market prices, a recent detailed study on US-
Mexican agricultural price convergence showed that the relatively large number of periods required for the 
domestic price to adjust to 95 percent of the international price change (20 months for wheat, 33 months for 
maize and 77 months for soybean) did not shorten under the new agricultural policies (Yunez-Naude and 
Barceinas 2003).  
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Estimating rates of distortions to agricultural incentives 
 
 
The present project’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008) defines indicators of policy-
induced agricultural price distortions (as distinct from market factors, infrastructural 
investments and services that change prices and incentives more generally). The focus is on 
government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they 
would be under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of 
agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only 
estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the 
foreign exchange market), but it also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural 
sectors for comparative evaluation, thereby considering the overall policy impact on farmer 
and food consumer incentives. 
The estimates below are similar in nature to the producer support estimates and 
consumer subsidy equivalents (PSEs and CSEs) generated by the OECD for Mexico, but we 
depart from their methodology in four important ways. First, instead of taking border prices 
as the relevant international prices, we adjust border prices for freight, port, insurance, 
financial costs, handling, and transportation charges to main domestic markets. Second, 
taking into account new estimates of the way in which Mexican regional markets work, we 
use a weighted average of farm gate prices adjusted for transportation costs to main markets 
as the relevant domestic price for comparison (instead of using the simple national average of 
domestic prices). Third, unlike the OECD study, we do not consider the PROCAMPO and 
PACE payments as crop-specific payments but rather classify them as general non-product-
specific payments. This is because these payments are similar in nature to decoupled 
payments. Fourth, our estimates use the international (undistorted) price rather than the 
domestic price as the base to calculate the rate of distortion. Specifically, the Nominal Rate of 
Assisstance (NRA) is estimated as NRA=(domestic price minus border price)/border price. 
The OECD calculates this distortion—which it calls Market Price Support (MPS)—as a 
percentage of the domestic (distorted) price: MPS=(domestic price minus border 
price)/domestic price.  
In this chapter, and like the OECD, we use the official exchange rate in all our 
calculations, since for most of the period we analyze the black market premium was very 
low. Even between 1990 and 1994 the black market premium was only about 3 percent on  
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average, and since 1995 it has been zero. The premium was about 26 percent between 1983 
and 1986, 6 percent in 1987, and then rose to 17 percent during 1987 to 1989. It is important 
to mention that the real exchange rate showed high variations during the period covered. By 
the end or our sample, the real exchange rate of the Mexican Peso, calculated by the Bank of 
Mexico against a basket of currencies, was about 15 percent below the average level for the 
last twenty years. But compared with the average for the last twenty years it was 43 percent 
above in 1995, 25 percent in 1996 and only 5 percent in 1997 (and 48 percent above in the 





The goods covered in this study represent more than two-thirds of the total value of 
agricultural output in Mexico (Table 4). Annual crops represents between 19 and 24 percent 
of total; coffee and sugar cane represent between 5 and 7 percent, and animal products 
between 38 and 42 percent. Beef, maize and milk are the most important products in terms of 
the value of output. The most important products in terms of final household food 
consumption expenditure are milk and meat (Figure 4). 
 
Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to farmers 
 
Our estimates of the NRA for the years 1979-2004 for the products covered here are 
summarized in Table 5. For comparative purposes, so too are the NRA equivalents of the 
OECD’s PSEs for the period since 1986. Aggregates for exportables, import-competing 
products and all covered products are also shown, using as weights the value of production at 
undistorted prices. Like the OECD’s PSE, the NRA measure incorporates the different types 
of assistance for inputs received by the sector, such as fertilizers, pesticides, credit, fuel and 
electricity, seed, machinery and miscellaneous payments. 
The NRA estimates for exportables are negative over the period we analyze except 
occasionally for beef, indicating that exportables in general have been taxed. The tax was 
very high on coffee and tomatoes, exceeding 40 percent in some years. The five-year 
averages of the NRA for importables are positive over the period, indicating that in general 
import-competing industries have been protected. There is a large degree of variation in the  
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level of assistance to specific products, however: by 2000-04, some important importable 
products had almost zero or even negative NRAs (barley, maize, sorghum, soybeans, beans 
and eggs) while products such as wheat, rice, milk, sugar cane and chicken meat had 
relatively high NRAs (between 40 and 80 percent).  
The NRA for importables was lowest in 1995-99, following the strong peso 
devaluation – having been relatively high in the first half of the 1990s because of 
overvaluation of the currency; but in the present decade it has risen somewhat, to an average 
of 9 percent. The difference between assistance to exportable versus import-competing 
covered products is illustrated in summary form on an annual basis in Figure 5, where it can 
be seen that the NRA has been trending downwards in recent years due to falling direct 
assistance to both importables and exportables. 
The inclusion of guesstimates for non-covered products to the weighted average for 
all covered products alters the numbers a little. They are altered further when the steady 
increase in non-product-specific subsidies, discussed above, is added to get the total NRA for 
all agriculture. For example, in recent years the PROCAMPO, ASERCA, and PACE 
programs had grown to more than 4 percent of the total undistorted value of agricultural 
production. That is, so-called decoupled non-product-specific subsidies have added 4 
percentage points to the aggregate NRA, raising it by one-third. Together those adjustments 
bring the estimated NRA for the whole sector to 12 percent in 2000-04 (top half of Table 6).
3  
The final row in the top half of Table 6 reports an index of trade bias in agricultural 
policies. The negative sign indicates that the composition of assistance to farms has an anti-
trade bias, and its size indicates that the bias has persisted over time, being only slightly 
smaller this decade than in the latter 1980s. This implies the country still has some way to go 
before it is fully exploiting its comparative advantages within the farm sector. 
 
Relative rate of assistance and anti-trade bias for agriculture 
 
Table 6 also shows the weighted average NRA for just tradable agricultural industries, and 
also for non-agricultural tradables. Following the Anderson et al. (2008) methodology, the 
latter was generated by subdividing non-agricultural industries into exportables, nontradables 
and import-competing sectors. We assume the NRA is zero for exportables and nontradables, 
                                                 
3 The pattern of distortions we estimate across time is similar to that calculated by OECD (compare the left- and 
right-hand sides of Table 5), but there are important differences for some goods. In particular, since we add 
additional costs to the border price, our NRA has been a little lower than the OECD’s during the past 15 years.  
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and we assume the NRA for import-competing non-ag industries is given by the trade 
restrictiveness index estimated by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).  It is then possible to to 
generate estimates of the Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA), shown in the lower part of 
Table 6 and, in annual form, in Figure 6. Like the NRA, the RRA has fluctuated 
considerably. If the period just before the 1994 devaluation is ignored, the RRA has gradually 
risen over the past three decades from slightly negative to slightly positive, with the five-year 
averages moving from -4 percent in the early 1980s to +5 percent in 2000-04.  
  The previously mentioned negative correlation between the real exchange rate and the 
NRA for agricultural tradables is clear from Figure 7. That suggests if the currency were to 
be left to float and find its own level, there may be less fluctuation in the NRA in future. 
  
Consumer Tax Equivalent for food 
 
Table 7 shows the consumer tax equivalent (CTE) for food products, derived from the CSEs 
generated by the OECD. The pattern is somwhat similar to that of NRAs, with the CTE 
negative in the latter 1980s, slightly positive in the latter 1990s, and even larger early this 
century but falling over the past three years as assistance to agriculture has moved from 
market price support to more-direct, somewhat decoupled assistance. As in many countries, 






Economic policy developments affecting Mexico’s agricultural sector since the late 1980s, 
and in particular since the late 1990s, has shown a clear departure from the interventionist 
schemes of the past. By the end of our sample period, and for agricultural products covered in 
this study, the NRA was 12 percent. Although it appears that assistance increased when 
compared to the 1995-99 period, this average is less than half that of 1990-94. Importantly, 
by 2004 more than a half of the assistance to Mexican farmers came from non-product-
specific assistance. The current farm income support scheme provides assistance to certain 
commercial producers of grains and oilseeds only when commodity prices decline. Despite 
the launching of two new and comprehensive programs for the agricultural sector (Blindaje  
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agropecuario-Agri-food Armour in 2002 , and the Acuerdo Nacional para el Campo-
National Agreement for the Countryside in 2003), the size and composition of SAGARPA’s 
activities is similar to what prevailed in previous years (Zahniser, Young and Wainio 2005). 
That is, even under the strong pressure from both small and large producer associations, the 
government has been able to resist raising those budgetary outlays, and the total budget 
devoted to the government’s activities in agriculture and rural development has been held at 
about 15 percent of total agricultural gross domestic product (both crops and livestock). 
Nonetheless, as indicated above, the persistent anti-trade bias in agricultural policies suggests 
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    1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 
1980-
2005 
Annual growth            
Total  GDP  2.0 1.8 1.6 5.4 2.0 2.6 
    Agriculture  2.3 0.4 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.4 
    Industry  1.1 2.4 0.9 7.3 0.4 2.4 
    Services  2.3 1.8 1.9 5.0 2.7 2.7 
             
Sectoral shares 
of GDP        
    Agriculture  6.9 6.9 6.2 6.0 5.4 6.3 
    Industry  26.1 25.7 26.3 27.3 26.7 26.4 
    Services  67.0 67.4 67.4 66.8 67.9 67.3 
       
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INEGI 
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Table 2: Area planted by main crop, Mexico, 1980 to 2004  
(percent) 
 
  1980-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000  2000-04  
       
Maize  51  50  54  53  52  
Wheat  6  7  6  5  4  
Forage  15  16  14  18  21  
       
Fruit  1  1  1  1  1  
Vegetables  2  3  3  3  3  
       
Industrial crops  4  4  3  3  3  
Legumes  15  15  15  15  14  
Oilseeds  6  5  4  2  2  
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SIAP-SAGARPA 
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Table 3: Main agricultural policy measures, Mexico, mid-1980s to 2005 
 
 Mid-1980s  1995  2005  
  Price and income support measures   Price and income support measures   Price and income support measures  



































Maize  x     P x X X X X         TQ  TQ  X        TQ*  
Beans  x     P x X X X X         TQ  TQ  X       TQ  
Wheat  X     P X X X          T TQ     X        Free  
Barley  x     P X X X          Q TQ     X        Free  
Sorghum  X P X T X X             Free    X        Free  
Rice  X     T X T T X X         X      X        Free  
Soybeans  X P X T X X             Free    X        Free  
Sugarcane    X P x X Q             Q TQ            
Coffee     X    P X T        T TQ            
Milk      P Q X          T          TQ  
Beef & 
Veal  
  T F r e e T X                  X     Free  
Pigmeat      T T T X                      
Poultrymeat      P           Q TQ         X     
Eggs      P T X           Q            
                          
Notes:  (P): import permits, (T): import tariffs, (TQ): tariff- rate quota. Under NAFTA, original agreed quotas were in general not binding or 
were increased by the Mexican Government. In 1995, payments were granted for the production of the crops listed in the table plus safflower 
and cotton. Since the Autumm/Winter 1995/96 crop season, under  PROCAMPO farmers may now devote their land to any crop, livestock, or 
forestry production, or place it in an approved environmental programme. Nonetheless, still by 2004, almost half of the farmers thought that they 
actually needed to farm cultivos básicos in order to receive the subsidy. 
ASERCA market development: Programa Nacional de Apoyos Directos a la Comercialización y Desarrollo de Mercados Regionales; 
CONASUP: Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares;  PROCAMPO: Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo; PROGRAN: Programa 
de Estímulos a la Productividad Ganadera; NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement; PACE: Programa de Apoyo a la 
Comercialización Ejidal.  




Table 4: Share of products in total value of agricultural production at distorted prices, 
Mexico, 1980 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
  1980-89  1990-99  2000-04  
Annual crops  23.5  23.6  19.2  
Barley  0.4  0.4  0.5  
Beans  1.7  2.6  2.1  
Maize  10.8  12.0  9.6  
Rice  0.5  0.3  0.1  
Sorghum  3.8  3.0  2.8  
Soybean  1.3  0.3  0.1  
Tomato  1.9  2.8  2.8  
Wheat  3.0  2.3  1.3  
     
Perennial crops  6.1  6.6  5.4  
Coffee  2.6  2.5  1.1  
Sugar cane  3.5  4.1  4.3  
     
Animal products  43.9  38.0  42.5  
Milk  9.8  9.2  9.9  
Eggs  4.5  4.2  4.9  
Beef  13.9  10.8  10.7  
Poultry  6.1  7.2  9.9  
Pig  9.6  6.6  7.1  
     
Total  73.5  68.2  67.1  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SIAP-SAGARPA 28
Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance for covered agricultural products, Mexico, 1979 to 2004 
 (percent) 
  Author’s results  OECD’s results
a 
   1979-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 1986-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Exportables 
b -27.6 -21.3 15.8 -8.2  -12.5    
Beef  -17.5 -7.6 37.7 11.6 -2.7 -13.7 26.7 7.7 3.3 
Coffee -63.8 -49.7 -23.6 -28.1  -33.8 -52.5 -10.2 -7.2 0.0 
Tomato -24.2 -45.8 -23.1 -38.6  -37.1 -8.1 -4.3 -17.1 3.5 
    
Import-competing 
b 14.7 13.9 35.9 3.8  19.5  
Barley 7.1 -12.7 28.1 -14.3  -6.8 1.3 57.6 12.8 13.5 
Beans 44.2 -17.6 -10.8 -13.2  -0.4 -28.4 17.4 -2.7 40.2 
Eggs -1.5 -6.3 2.2 -16.1  -15.7 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 
Maize 20.1 23.7 27.9 -12.5  -2.9 28.1 62.6 5.6 29.6 
Milk 137.3 145.6 175.0 60.5  85.7 209.3 55.7 27.5 38.5 
Pigmeat -21.6 -20.4 6.2 -4.4  3.2 -21.6 3.7 -3.1 10.7 
Poultry 143.8 96.2 114.2 17.8  47.7 34.1 56.6 15.9 28.1 
Rice  -7.3 -5.4 20.1 3.6 37.5 -33.7 4.8 2.0 32.8 
Sorghum -1.0 1.4 -3.9 -14.8  -11.5 21.4 29.2 8.2 16.7 
Soybeans  38.5 38.6 26.1 -5.1 -2.7 4.5 17.2 2.5 10.8 
Sugar cane  -4.4 1.0 66.1 48.2  81.5 3.8 78.3 47.3 66.6 
Wheat 5.2 38.4 61.5 25.0  61.2 -19.3 23.5 4.4 22.4 
     
Total of covered products 
b 0.7 1.1 28.8 0.1  9.2 -2.3 31.9 7.2 21.4 
Dispersion of covered products 
c 69.5 65.7 56.0 33.2  41.3 67.0 32.6 20.0 21.3 
 % coverage at undistorted prices  79 79 72 76  73 74 69 69 68 
a  OECD NRA defined as 100*(NPC-1).
 b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.  
c Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet and conversion to NRAs of PSEs from OECD (2007) 
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Table 6: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, 
Mexico, 1979 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
   1979-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Covered products 
a  0.7 1.1 28.8 0.1 9.2
Non-covered    10.7 9.9 31.4 3.3 2.6
All agricultural products 
a  2.9 3.0 29.5 0.8 7.4
Non-product-specific (NPS) 
assistance
b  0.0 0.0 1.3 3.4 4.2
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)  2.9 3.0 30.8  4.2  11.6
Trade bias index
c  -0.45 -0.39 -0.27 -0.23 -0.34
    
Assistance to just tradables:    
   All agricultural tradables 
b 3.0 3.0 31.2  4.2  11.8
   All non-agricultural tradables  7.4 4.0 5.8  3.2  6.8
   Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
d  -4.2 -1.1 24.1 1.0 4.7
    
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.  
 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS)  assistance  
 
c Trade Bias Index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and 
NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of 
the agricultural sector. 
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Table 7: Consumer tax equivalent




 1986-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-05  
      
Beef  -14  26  7  3  
Coffee  -66  -18  -18  0  
Tomatoes  -8  -3  -21  5  
Barley  1  44  7  11  
Beans  -13  25  -3  32  
Eggs  0  3  0  0  
Maize  -2  25  -14  13  
Milk  129  19  5  26  
Pigmeat  -21  5  -3  8  
Poultry  33  53  15  22  
Rice  -51  1  4  4  
Sorghum  0  -5  -3  0  
Soybeans  -4  8  12  2  
Sugar  4  79  86  117  
Wheat  -54  -17  -6  1  
Total CTE  -8  21  4  17  
 
 
Source: The negative of the OECD's (2007) Consumer Support Estimate (CSE), expressed at 
undistorted prices  
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Figure 1: Poverty by regions, Mexico, 1984 to 2004 
(proportion of relevant group) 





















Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Source: Sexto Informe de Gobierno 2006-President Fox







Figure 3: Government expenditures on main farm programs under SAGARPA, Mexico, 1995 
to 2005 
 
(2005 US$ millions) 
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import competing and all covered 





























































































































Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance to all non-agricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance































































































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Figure 7: Real exchange rate and nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural tradables,
a 
Mexico, 1979 to 2004 
 





























Source: Central Bank for RER and author’s estimates of NRA  
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Appendix Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, Mexico, 1979 to 2004 
(percent) 












eat  All 
1979  -40  15 -17 -12 -10 -10 115 -13 188  -9 -25  -2  0 -55 -13  -3 
1980  -9 15 -9 -7 24 14  144  -11  156  -16  8 25  -52  -52 -6  5 
1981  18  -12 16  -84 32 58  220 -6  178  -17  4 44 -2  -20 17 26 
1982  -48  2  -8 -93 -10  39  83 -33 158  -4  14  29  0 -43  -7  -3 
1983  51 244 -50 -93 -16  1  59 -50 101 -30 -20  31  4  24  -3 -21 
1984  71  1  -38  -95  -29 19  204  -18 82 31 12  104 22  2 42  0 
1985  11 46 -2  7 -5 16  324 -9  108 89 11 73 21  -51  121 22 
1986  7 -29 -15 -68 -21  18 165 -57  44 -33  6  30  21 -35  20  -8 
1987  -42 -31 -33 -70  -1  64 105 -51 122 -22  18  60  -5 -55  18 -10 
1988  -11 -21 -13 -84  10  4  40  4  99 -44 -13  10 -19 -35  29  -8 
1989  -28 -53  26 -33 -15  16  93  10 108 -17 -14  20 -13 -53  4  10 
1990  -21 -17  34  -6 -11  27 265  -6 161 -11 -13  7  18 -27  48  23 
1991 50 4  32  -13  -11  42  129 1  136 9 4  73  85  -57  77  24 
1992  47  -11 43  -26  2 30  116 16 81 15  0 30 88 39 47 38 
1993  40  -10 48  -28 15 30  195  4  103 55  5 26 86  -31 64 34 
1994  25  -20 30  -45 15 10  170 17 90 33  -16 -6 54  -41 72 25 
1995  -40 -45 -20 -55 -15 -14  24 -23  10  4  -1 -15 -15 -72  0 -19 
1996  -12 -21  13 -22 -11 -20  34 -22  10  8 -21 -10  33 -45  30  -7 
1997  -13  7  31 -32  -6 -17  63 -10  28  -4 -19 -16  41 -32  17  5 
1998  4 -2 24  -32  -22 -5 87  9 24 -1  -15 -4 56  -33 40 10 
1999  -11 -4 10  1  -27 -7 95 23 16 12  -18 19  126  -11 38 12 
2000  -4 12 12  -35  -21  9 85 -2 55 27 -6 -8  105  -18 60 17 
2001  2 41 -1  -34  -13 11 96  4 42 60  -11 21 97  -41 86 16 
2002  -8  -13 14  -28  -20 -6  107 23 72 69 -9 -6 69  -39 60 17 
2003  -23  -15  -16  -27  -16  -11 79  5 42 17  -11  5 67  -47 51  1 
2004  -1  -27  -23  -45 -9  -18 61  -13 27 14  -22  -25 70  -40 49 -6 
 




Appendix Table 2: Value shares of primary production of covered and non-covered 
products
a, Mexico, 1979 to 2004 
(percent) 
 Barley  Bean  Beef  Coffee  Egg  Maize Milk 
Pig-















1979  1  3 23 1  4 11 6 1421423  7  4 1 7
1980  1  3 19 0  3 14 5 1121417  5  4 2 2
1981  1  5 15 3  3 13 4 1111514  4  4 2 6
1982 1 2  17 4 4 8 6 1721313  6  5 2 0
1983  0  1 22 4  4 13 5 1621413  3  3 2 0
1984  0  2 18 4  5 13 3 1530412  3  4 2 3
1985  1  2 17 1  5 16 3 1331513  6  3 2 2
1986  1  4 19 2  7 11 3 1341413  6  4 1 8
1987 1 3  20 3 5 8 3 1231414  1 0   3 1 9
1988  0  2 21 7  5 10 5 921504  5  3 2 1
1989  1  3 20 1  6 10 4 731425  6  5 2 4
1990  1  6 16 1  6 13 2 830414  5  3 2 7
1991  0  4 16 1  5 11 4 830312  1 1   3 2 8
1992  0  3 16 0  5 16 5 740413  5  3 2 9
1993  0  5 14 0  5 16 3 630213  1 0   3 2 9
1994  0  4 16 1  5 15 4 640214  6  3 2 9
1995  1  4 16 1  5 16 5 650305  9  3 2 0
1996  1  4 11 1  6 17 6 760503  8  3 2 1
1997  1  3 12 1  6 15 5 860404  7  3 2 5
1998  0  4 13 1  6 13 5 680403  7  2 2 7
1999  0  3 15 1  7 13 5 580302  7  2 2 8
2000  1  2 15 1  7 11 6 770302  7  2 2 8
2001  1  2 16 0  7 11 5 780303  6  2 2 8
2002  1  4 15 0  7 13 5 670303  6  2 2 8
2003  1  3 18 0  7 12 5 670303  6  2 2 6
2004  1  3 20 0  6 13 5 780303  7  1 2 4
 
 
a Valued in US dollars at undistorted farmgate prices, with each row adding to 100 percent. 
 




Appendix Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to covered, uncovered and all agricultural 
products, to exportable and import-competing
 agricultural industries
a, and relative to non-

























1979 -3  7 -1 -28 13 -1 8 -9
1980 5  24 9 -23 23 9 10 0
1981 26 39 30 -18 48 30 10 18
1982 -3 -8 -4 -38 13 -4 9  -12
1983 -21  -9 -19 -50 -3 -19 4 -22
1984 0  11 3 -47 26 3 4  -1
1985 22 43 26 -21 46 27 6 19
1986 -8 -3 -7 -29 3 -7 2 -9
1987 -10  -1  -8 -46 15 -8 3 -11
1988 -8 -2 -7 -38 13 -7 5  -11
1989 10 12 10 -6 19 10 4  6
1990 23 35 26 6 35 27 5 21
1991 24 20 23 -17 46 23 5 17
1992 38 48 41 38 43 42 6 34
1993 34 33 34 2 51 34 6 27
1994 25 21 30 -6 40 30 7 22
1995 -19 -15 -15 -45 -7 -15 2 -17
1996 -7 -3 -3 -18 -2 -3 2 -5
1997 5 7 9 -6 10 9 4 5
1998 10 11 13 -9 19 13 4  9
1999 12 16 17 -1 21 17 4 13
2000 17 15 20 -5 28 20 6 14
2001 16  9 19 -20 31 19 7 11
2002 17  4 18 -13 26 19 7 11
2003  1 -4  4 -30 16 4 7 -3
2004  -6 -10  -4 -31 6 -4 6 -10
 
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies, assistance to nontradables and non-
covered products, and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance.
 
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ estimates  
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Source: Authors’ calculations and OECD (2007) 
 